GoldBod Debate: Why a US$214 Million ‘Loss’ May Actually Be Ghana’s Biggest Economic Gain – Senyo Hosi Writes

The recent public debate over the reported US$214 million loss linked to Ghana’s Gold-for-Reserves Programme, popularly known as GoldBod, has reignited broader questions about how economic policy outcomes should be measured.

According to Senyo Hosi, an entrepreneur, finance expert, and economic policy analyst, the controversy reflects a fundamental misunderstanding between accounting losses and economic policy costs.

In an extensive policy commentary, Hosi argued that while traditional accounting focuses strictly on revenues and costs, economic policy must be assessed by the value it creates for the wider economy, not just its balance-sheet position.

He explained that the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP), operated through GoldBod under the Bank of Ghana, was designed with clear objectives: to generate foreign exchange, build gold reserves, and reduce gold smuggling, which for years deprived Ghana of significant export earnings.

According to data cited in his analysis, Ghana previously lost nearly one-third of its gold production to smuggling, particularly from artisanal and small-scale mining. Since the establishment of GoldBod in 2025, official gold exports from the ASM sector have increased significantly, a development Hosi attributes largely to the policy’s aggressive pricing strategy aimed at discouraging smuggling.

While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) flagged the US$214 million as a trading loss, Hosi insists this figure should be viewed as a policy cost, not a failure. He points out that the same programme has helped Ghana achieve its reserve accumulation targets ahead of schedule, strengthen the cedi, and stabilise inflation.

He further noted that Ghana’s gross international reserves have risen sharply, contributing to a notable appreciation of the cedi against the dollar in 2025. This currency stability, he argued, has translated into billions of cedis in savings on external debt servicing, government foreign exchange payments, and import costs—benefits that far outweigh the reported cost of the programme.

On inflation, Hosi referenced recent data showing a sharp decline from 24 percent in 2024 to about 6.3 percent by late 2025, crediting improved foreign exchange inflows and reserve buffers driven by official gold exports.

Addressing criticism that the IMF raised concerns over the programme, Hosi dismissed claims of hostility, stressing that Bretton Woods institutions naturally push countries to optimise costs. However, he described Ghana’s rapid currency recovery as an unexpected outcome that challenges conventional IMF assumptions about adjustment under programme conditions.

In conclusion, Hosi maintained that economic policy should not be reduced to narrow profit-and-loss thinking.

“An accounting loss is not necessarily an economic loss,” he argued, cautioning that focusing solely on figures risks “knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing.”

He, however, called on policymakers to refine the GoldBod framework, particularly by narrowing the gap between official and open market exchange rates, to reduce future policy costs and sustain long-term gains.

Read the full statement below;

GOLDBOD: LOSS OR NO LOSS?

The Price of Everything and The Value of Nothing

As a father of two with others I care for, I am clear that my spending is not aimed at generating profit for

myself. Instead, it is to ensure these dependants have a social, economic, and spiritual life that makes

them impactful and productive members of society. As an entrepreneur, my expenditure is to deliver

responsible profits for myself and my shareholders, along with a constructive economic impact that often

requires patience to realise. I prioritise value delivery and development, focusing on short-term financial

sustainability, with the hope that it will serve as a foundation for medium- to long-term profits. Although

these goals are different, they are similar in that both aim to achieve their respective objectives.

The recent debate about the reported US$214mn loss by the BoG in its Gold-for-reserves programme, also

known as the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP), has been quite fascinating. It has been

passionate, sentimental, and technical all in one. Some contend it is a loss, while others argue it is not. So,

what exactly is a loss? Can’t we simply agree on what a loss is? In economics, where strict science meets

the complexity and flexibility of human nature, almost everything is ambiguous. Therefore, it’s not so

straightforward but can still be honest.

That’s why, while ‘1+1’ equals two everywhere in the world, the success of an economic policy is not

consistent everywhere. Even the mighty IMF and World Bank cannot guarantee a perfect outcome in

their interventions. There is always an X-Factor.

1.0 LOSS OR NO LOSS?

From an accounting perspective, the establishment of loss is simply total revenue (TR) minus total cost

(TC). If TC is greater than TR, you have a loss. In finance, there is sometimes a slight shift. Instead of TR or

TC, you may be considering the present value of TR and TC, which may require a discount factor (in

layman’s terms, an interest rate) to determine. Let me give an example to explain: imagine investing

Ghs100 in a venture at the start of the year and receiving Ghs110 at the end of the year. In accounting

terms, you have made a Ghs10 profit. It is as simple as that. However, financial economics looks at it

differently. It first considers the opportunity cost — what else you could have done with that money?. Let

us say you could have invested in treasury bills or notes at 15% p.a. This means you could have earned

Ghs15, not just Ghs10. Since you earned less than the Ghs15 you could have made, you have effectively

incurred an economic loss. I am sure you will agree that that book long ‘na wahala’.

In economic policy, it is an entirely different game. Every economic policy intervention must be evaluated

on its incremental economic value and aligned with its economic objectives. That is why expenditure on

education is not viewed as a cost but as an investment to maintain the quality of labour, which in turn

drives and sustains economic growth into the future. This explains why we discuss primary surpluses and

deficits or economic costs and benefits, rather than accounting losses or profits.

Each economic policy intervention’s impact, as planned, must align with the desired economic outcomes.

For example, an economic policy of promoting exports through export subsidies (a cost to taxpayers)

must align with its objectives, which may include inflation, exchange rate stability, GDP growth,

employment, socio-economic equality as measured by the Gini and Human Development Indices, etc. A loss in economic policy terms should be assessed based on the economic outcomes the intervention

seeks to achieve, compared to the actual measurable results. The evaluation should consider not only the

policy’s costs but also its benefits.

Simply put, “an accounting loss or financial loss is not an economic loss! So not all loss be loss and not all

profit na benefit!”

2.0 THE GOLDBOD

Prior to the formation of the GOLDBOD, one thing was certain: Ghana was not fully benefiting from its

gold output. According to the United Nations COMTRADE, the United Arab Emirates imported USD7.1

billion worth of gold from Ghana in 2022 and 2023. Ghana, however, reported official data of USD4.8 billion.

Using the UAE (a major importer of our ASM gold) as a benchmark, about one-third (almost 33%) of our

production was smuggled and left unaccounted for.

In years past, Ghana had to rely on borrowed foreign exchange through Eurobonds and Syndicated Loans

to COCOBOD to build its foreign reserves, mainly due to overdependence on primary exports. The

underperformance of cocoa exports and the retention of export receipts offshore (part of Ghana’s stability

agreement with foreign mining companies) by Ghana’s foreign-dominated mining companies meant

that even if gold production and gold exports improved, it could not support the building of Ghana’s

reserve buffers. In the end, Ghana could not borrow itself into perpetuity and ended up with the Domestic

Debt Exchange Programme (DDEP) and an external debt restructuring programme, which were integral

parts of Ghana’s IMF-supported reforms programme under the broader debt restructuring programme.

The GOLDBOD was set up with clear monetary policy-related objects.

1. Generate foreign exchange for the country; and

2. Support the accumulation of gold reserves by the Bank of Ghana.

3. Oversee, monitor and undertake the buying, selling, assaying, refining, exporting or other related

activity in respect of gold.

The policy rationale for these objects is to centralise gold trade, optimise forex inflows, accelerate gold

reserve accumulation, and generate national benefits from the entire value chain of the country’s gold

resources for economic revitalisation and sustainable growth.

Ghana’s GOLDBOD sources gold from mainly licensed artisanal and small-scale miners, using a regulated

network of authorised buyers and aggregators. It pays in cedis based on the Bank of Ghana’s reference

rates and either exports the gold or allocates it to the Bank of Ghana for reserve accumulation.

3.0 HAVE WE REALISED OUR OBJECTS?

The year 2025 marked the inception of GOLDBOD, and in just one year, Ghana’s Artisanal and Small-Scale

Mining (ASM) gold export value has increased from 63.6 metric tons (mt) in 2024 to 101mt as of 23rd

December 2025. Reference is made to actual export volumes in metric tonnes to ensure that the current

higher gold prices do not distort our analysis. It should be noted that this is not just a result of a significant

surge in production but rather an optimisation of the accounting of Ghana’s gold production by drastically

reducing smuggling. This achievement is due to GOLDBOD’s work, and we must acknowledge their

contribution. GOLDBOD and its practices have successfully optimised our ‘official’ gold trade.

According to the IMF, the BoG has had to recognise a trading loss of USD214mn (GHS2.4bn). This is

undoubtedly an accounting loss. We are also told that it has been due to GOLDBOD disincentivising

smuggling by buying at world market prices, thereby being unable to cover its operational costs. From a

pure trading perspective, this does not make sense. The pricing strategy to offer world-market prices to

miners for buying their gold output is to incentivise them to sell to GOLDBOD rather than to the foreign

gold buyers who had become entrenched in the market and were offering prices 1-2% below international

prices. This is thus an aggressive entry into the market to break the entrenched foreign dominance in

Ghana’s gold trading market, without which the GOLDBOD would have struggled immensely to penetrate. Indeed, it is through this pricing strategy that smuggling has been significantly reduced, and

Ghana is fully reaping the benefits of gold exports.

Thus, from a policy perspective, the USD214mn (GHS2.4 bn) trading loss must be viewed differently, not

through a financial or accounting lens. For instance, the forex inflows from the reduced smuggling can

be transformative and more beneficial to the broader economy, so incurring ‘the loss’ makes sense and

becomes an economic policy cost required to yield greater economic policy benefits.

From what I gather in my research and interviews with market players, the ‘trading losses’ also arise from

the differentials demanded by gold producers for the difference between open market exchange rates

and the Bank of Ghana interbank rates used to price the ASM gold. To this, if the Bank of Ghana’s interbank

FX rate is set at Ghs11.0 to US$1.00 and the open market rate stands at Ghs12.0 to US$1.00, producers will

demand Ghs12.0, not Ghs11.0. GOLDBOD will increase its buying price to miners, often midway through

the differential, through a ‘so-called bonus’ to ensure producers do not lose out on their market reality.

For example, if the world price is $100, the BoG rate is Ghs11.0 to US$1.00, and the open market rate is

Ghs12.0 to US$1.00, producers will receive Ghs1,100. If the same producer sells his gold to a smuggler at

$100, he will receive GHs1,200 at the open market rate of Ghs12.0 to US$1.00. To disincentivise producers

from smuggling, the GOLDBOD adjusts its prices upwards by offering a bonus of about Ghs50 (often

about 50% of the FX differential), so producers receive Ghs1,150 and minimise the risk of selling to

smugglers. This ‘Ghs50’ is a major reason for the reported ‘trading losses’. This is effectively, a foreign

exchange loss.

4.0 DOMESTIC GOLD PURCHASE PROGRAMME (DGPP): LOSS OR NO LOSS?

What we know for sure is that the DGPP policy operation through GOLDBOD has cost us USD214mn and

possibly counting. Various explanations have emerged, but the fact is that GOLDBOD is a policy institution

tasked with supporting the operationalisation of the DGPP’s monetary policy intervention.

The IMF in its latest staff report stated that, “The scaling up of the Domestic Gold Purchase Program

(DGPP) has allowed the BoG to meet its program reserve accumulation objectives, reaching the 2028

reserve coverage target in 2025.” That is a commendation by all standards.

Gross international reserves are always at the core of a currency’s stability. So, the lower the Gross

international reserves, the lower the value of a currency in a floating FX rate regime. The DGPP

programme has led to an increase in the BoG’s gross reserves from USD8.98bn in 2024 to $11.12bn as of

October 2025, and they are projected to reach about $13bn by year-end 2025.

The IMF, in its own papers, have attributed the nominal exchange rate appreciation to the building of

reserves and our FX inflows, which is widely known to be driven by the surge in official gold export receipts.

Our receipts have surged from two fronts.

1. The surge in official gold export quantity. We have recovered our one-third loss to smuggling by

moving official volumes from 63mt in 2024 to 101mt in 2025. This is attributable to the GOLDBOD

policy intervention.

2. Surge in global gold prices. Prices moved from about an average of $2,386/oz (LBMA data) in 2024

to $3,439.37/oz in 2025, marking a 44% increase.

Undoubtedly, the stars have aligned with our own actions to realise the blessings of the now.

Without any fear of contradiction, our foreign exchange bounce back has been a well-orchestrated homegrown strategy and alignment of monetary and fiscal policy anchored on the productivity of the

GOLDBOD under the BoG’s DGPP programme! This is why any discussion of the cost of the GOLDBOD

intervention must be carried out together with an evaluation of the enormous economic benefit to Ghana

in 2025.

To evaluate the economic benefits of this policy intervention, we will examine these key indicators.

1. Impact on the USD/GHS exchange rate

2. Impact on Government debt service savings

3. Impact on Government’s foreign exchange expenditure savings

4. Inflation

5. The import bill

4.1 Impact on the USD/GHS exchange rate

Ghana moved from an actual BoG interbank GHS/USD average rate of GHs14.2 to US$1.00 in 2024 to 12.53

in 2025, marking a 13% average appreciation. On a year-on-year basis, Ghana moved from a year-end of

Ghs14.7 to US$1.00 in 2024 to GHs11.2 to US$1.00 in 2025, marking a 32.47% appreciation.

What is most instructive is the average exchange rate forecast in the IMF’s supervised 2025 budget, which

projected a depreciation of about 9%. The 2025 budget was built on the assumption of an average

GHS/USD rate of GHs15.95 (which, to be fair, was about the street-market rate as of December 2024).

GHs15.95, therefore, serves as the policy benchmark for any fair analysis of the performance of the policy

benefits from relevant exchange rate-related policy interventions.

4.2 Impact on Government’s external debt service

2025 External

Debt Payments

Amount (USD)

GHS Amt @Budget

Average Rate (15.95)

GHS Amt @Realised

Average Rate (12.53)

Savings

Interest

504,880,793

8,052,848,642

6,326,156,331

1,726,692,311

Amortization

605,846,212

9,663,247,087

7,591,253,040

2,071,994,046

Eurobond

709,025,252

11,308,952,764

8,884,086,404

2,424,866,360

Total

1,819,752,257

29,025,048,493

22,801,495,775

6,223,552,718

The table above summarises our external debt service position as at mid-December 2025. What it tells us

is that our ability to reverse the trajectory of the Ghana cedi from a projected year average of Ghs15.95 to

a realised average of GHs12.53 has saved the Ghanaian economy over GHS6.2billion. At year-end closing

rates, this saving is USD560mn. This is not a profit but an economic benefit from GOLGBOD policy actions.

As stated earlier, in economic policy terms, we focus on policy benefits and costs and not profits or losses.

4.3 Impact on the Government’s foreign exchange expenditure savings

To assess this, we should ideally examine the government’s foreign-exchange-based expenditure and

evaluate the benefits of the Ghana cedi’s appreciation. These will include payments to independent power

producers (IPPs), imports by government agencies and vendors, including capital expenditure vendors.

Extracting this accurately may be complex at this stage, so I will stick to a single item I can pull out: IPP

payments for 2025.

Forex

Payment

Amount in

US$

Amount in GHS using

@Budget Average Rate

GHs15.95 -US$1

Amount in GHS using @

Realised Average

GHs12.53 -US$1

Savings in

GHS

IPPs 1,887,862,617

30,111,408,740

23,654,918,590

6,456,490,150

From the above we have realised a saving in excess of GHS6.45bn. At year closing rates, this saving is USD582mn

 

4Inflation

The IMF country director, Dr Adrian Atler, in a recent interview with Benard Avle of CitiFM, explained that

the strengthening of the local currency has played a pivotal role in restoring price stability, helping

inflation fall from 24% in 2024 to 6.3% in November 2025, which is the lowest level in four years. He further

argued that the contrast between last year’s rapid currency depreciation and this year’s modest

appreciation clearly shows how exchange rate management has shaped the inflation path.

There is no denying that the GOLDBOD-inspired currency appreciation is a major contributory factor to

the BOG’s ability to reduce inflation from 24% to 6.3% as of the end of November 2025 (Ghana Statistical

Service).

4.5 The import bill

Ghana’s import bill is projected to end 2025 at about USD17.7bn. This projection is based on official January

to October data.

Forex

Payment

Amount (USD) Amount in GHS using

@Budget Average Rate

GHs15.95 -US$1

Amount in GHS using

@Realised Average

GHs12.53 -US$1

Net Benefit

(GHS)

2025 Import

Bill (est)

17,784,000,000 283,654,800,000

222,833,520,000

60,821,280,000

From the analysis above, the comparative saving exceeds GHS60bn for the Ghanaian importer and

consumer (including government consumption) and for the economy as a whole. This saving has

improved the real spending power of Ghanaians, which Fitch estimates at +2.5% (as at June 2025), over

120% increase from the spending power growth of +1.1% realised in 2024. With inflation heading further

down, we can only estimate a larger increase in the Ghanaian’s real spending power.

4.6 Summary

1. The appreciation of Ghana Cedis is foremostly a result of the BoG’s domestic gold purchase

programme (DGPP) operated by GOLDBOD. In other words, it is a GOLDBOD-inspired currency

appreciation.

2. The direct fiscal savings from the GOLDBOD-inspired appreciation are in excess of GHS12.6bn

(US$1.142bn), more than 5 times the policy cost of US$214mn (Ghs2.4bn). Ghs6.22bn on external

debt service and 6.45bn on IPP payments. If we were to add savings on import-related capex and

goods and service expenses across the central government and state-owned enterprises, this

would significantly increase.

3. According to the Bank of Ghana ACT, 2002 (ACT612), the primary object of the Bank of Ghana is to

maintain stability in the general level of prices. Achieving 6.3% inflation from 24% in less than a year

is a policy outcome success driven by its DGPP programme.

4. Over GHS60bn savings on our import expenditure have been realised and accrued to the

economy.

5. The US$214mn (Ghs2.4bn) is a policy cost and not a loss, as its economic policy outcomes

outweigh its financial cost.

5.0 THE IMF AND THE ‘LOSS’

Let us get it clear, there is no issue with the IMF flagging the US$214mn. It is their estimate of the policy

cost. I do not subscribe to the view that the Bretton Woods institutions are haters and wreckers. If it were

so, China would not be where it is today. Achieving all the economic benefits without spending US$214mn

would have been ideal. These institutions will always push economies to optimise, and that is what they

were doing.

Having said that, I am clear that the recovery is a shock to the IMF. A significant and swift depreciation is

often the starting point of resolving a balance-of-payments (BoP) problem (Culiuc and Park, 2025). This is

the view and expectation within the IMF, as duly captured by the authors who are IMF executives. In their study, which analysed worldwide data from 1971 to 2024, they concluded that “Equilibrium REER

depreciations are largest when an IMF-supported program is put in place after the initial depreciation

takes place.” Simply put, when countries enter IMF programs, the magnitude of currency depreciation

increases, suggesting that depreciation is part of the adjustment mechanism.

Consequently, our currency appreciation is a surprise and an outlier because it happened too soon. Of

course, it’s commodity price-driven, without much structural transformation, but the stability is welcome.

What they missed is the Ghanaian’s behavioural nature and propensity to smuggle. There is no need to

be antagonistic. Just like I said in the beginning, “while ‘1+1’ equals two everywhere in the world, the

success of an economic policy is not consistent everywhere”. They are aiding us with what they know,

and our homegrown policies must shape what they learn in ways that are practical and unique to

Ghana. We have brains too! We are writing the rulebook in Ghana and not in Washington, and this

is real progress!!! (to borrow from Harvard Economist Prof Dani Rodrik).

6.0 CONCLUSION

On the back of the realisation of the policy outcomes of low inflation, real fiscal savings and import bill

savings, I do not consider the $214mn or GHS2.4bn spent on the DGPP a loss. It is a policy cost worth the

spend if it was spent legitimately. Having said that, I must admit that policy must move to reduce or zero

out this cost to enable us to maximise the economic benefit from the policy.

The existence and quantum of disparities between Bank of Ghana foreign exchange rates and open

market rates are counterproductive and lead to foreign exchange losses. It is imperative that the BoG

moves to converge the exchange rates on the market to eliminate room for foreign exchange losses.

In addition, we need to build resilience and transform the economy’s structure to sustain the gains

realised so far. We cannot continue to be commodity-dependent!!!

Economic policy is not accounting; evaluating its impact requires a more holistic approach, or we

risk knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing.

Senyo K. Hosi

Entrepreneur, Finance & Economic Policy Analyst

31st December 2025